Substance Dualism Supplemental Series- Part #2


Part 2- The First Issue of Contention of the Mind-Body Problem- Establishing the Truth of Property-Dualism for Consciousness

In the second part of my Substance Dualism series, we turn to focusing on the first major issue of contention regarding the Mind-Body Problem; the nature of conscious properties and states (also relations, etc.). It is important to note that in Part 2, we do not assume the truth of substance dualism (the second issue of contention) and we can happily assume that “we” are in fact just our physical brain and central nervous system as the skeptics like to claim; instead our focus is specifically on the duality of the various mental properties and states that the brain produces on a phenomenological level.

We first provide 2 major arguments in favour of a property-dualist position vs. physicalist position; these include what I call the “Differences Argument” and the “Knowledge Argument”. Finally, we end the series discussing and assessing 5 major physicalist versions that attempt to account for mental properties and states and show them to be found wanting in that regard.


Audio Podcast here =–Substance-Dualism-Series-Part-2-e30lul .

Recommended Sources (for further study):

a) General Sources:
Crash Course Videos- (9 min video = by Crash Course lots of good videos on here) or history of Brain science = (12 mins) & what is consciousness = (10 min video).


b) Philosophical Behaviourism (Physicalist Theory #1- Reductionist);

What it is- and/or .
Arguments For and Against Logical/Philosophical Behaviourism- or .or OR Videos = (approx. 5 min on the different types of Behaviourism) & longer video = (1-hour video) ) & finally a video by world-famous Behaviorist B.F. Skinner = .

c) Type and Token Identity Theories (Physicalist Theories #2 & 3- Reductive and Non-Reductive respectively);

General Video Sources- 1-Hour long video = OR a 30 min video = OR a shorter 5 min video on Identity theory = .

J.J.C Smart (Type Identity Theorist)= (short write up).

General Longer Written Sources =
David Papineau (Token Identity Theorist) = (his 168 page book) &/or video source with him here = (1-hour) & (a shorter 30 min video).

d) Functionalism (the Artificial Intelligence or Software View- Non-Reductive Physicalist Theory #4);

General sources = or see a short 5 min video on it here = or longer more detailed videos here =–8&index=4&list=PLXKKIUdnOESEjAA24UVcMwR6R8TPZd540 & objections to Functionalism here = . OR see an 18 page write up on it here = .

Functionalist Proponent Jaegwon Kim Sources = his 27 page article on Functionalism and the Multiple Realization Problem = & also (short 5 min critique of his theory).

Proponent David Lewis sources = .

e) Eliminative Materialism (Physicalist Theory #5- Non-Reductive);

General Sources = (Video on what it is) & associated video with objections to it here = . Also here = . Write ups = (25 pages)

Proponent Paul Churchland and his wife = OR OR A short 6-page write up by Paul Churchland here = .


f) One of our Listeners Ken, feels that I have slightly misrepresented Buddhism during my brief mention of it at the beginning of the show on “Mere Property Dualism”, he was kind enough to share some sources for people to get a better understanding of Buddhist beliefs on the nature of consciousness;

A Buddhist Critique of Cartesian Dualism in the Cognitive Science
Naturalizing Mind and Qualia
William S. Waldron

And since you mentioned free will several times.

Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose: Freedom, Agency and Ethics for Mādhyamikas
Jay L Garfield

(alternative link)


g) Also, another listener named Darren (and skeptical physicalist) has provided a link to a counter of what I presented in Part 2 (along with some good sources for people to check out on the nature of qualia in relation to some up to date neuroscientific findings/studies, see here =  .

Further Darren is also currently working on developing an argument that he says proves the “non-existence” of the soul- thus here he tries to make a positive claim of his own that we are in fat just the brain (this is more appropriate to Parts #3 and 4 but will include it here as well) = .


13 thoughts on “Substance Dualism Supplemental Series- Part #2

  1. Sigh. I intentionally didn’t address some of Moreland’s arguments because I thought they were so completely idiotic that there was no way anyone else could take them seriously.

    So two things.

    One, thank you for repeating them and taking them seriously. It will make my website that much more thorough.

    Two thank you so much for taking them seriously, now I actually have to do more work and add them to my document. Its nice to know that you are such a giver. 🙂

    As a side note. Do you happen to know who was the first one to present these arguments? I’m having a hard time figuring out who I need to attribute the arguments to.


  2. Dale,

    At the beginning of your talk, you said something like…

    ”There’s a ‘mere property dualist.’ That’s someone like Buddhist, who believes that mental properties and states are [inaudible], they are non-physical entities or in nature, but substance itself, they would agree with atheists and sceptics, that it’s just a physical brain and central nervous system, that’s what we are.”

    Where are you getting this from?


    1. Hi Dale,

      ”This was my understanding of consciousness from a Buddhist perspective- would you say that is incorrect?”

      I’ve never heard of any Buddhist tradition which holds such view. But I don’t claim to know various views among different traditions, so I was just curious.

      ”What is the Buddhist position/s from you point of view on the question of mental properties and states vs. the substantial self?”

      Sorry, not sure what you are asking.

      ”So the brain thing is my just my saying, you wouldn’t deny the brain as a “substance” but deny a soul or essential substance.”

      Conventionally speaking, both mind (obviously I wouldn’t use the word ‘soul’) and body (brain etc.) can be seen as a “substance.” For example, in Tripiṭaka, mind and body are presented as distinct “substances” which are interdependent (analogy used is sheaves of reeds leaning against one another).

      But we tend to move away from dualism when we get to Mahayana and Vajrayana.

      So, if I was talking at a level of accepting brain as a “substance,” I would be also accepting mind as a “substance” in that instance. I wouldn’t be describing mind as epiphenomena of brain.


      1. Dale,

        Calling Theravada Buddhism “Buddhism proper” is like calling Judaism “Abrahamic religion proper” in my opinion.

        ”would be cool with accepting the brain as the only “substance” involved in producing them”

        No, I said I would not be describing mind as epiphenomena of brain. In other words, mind is not produced by brain. I don’t know any Buddhist tradition that teaches this.

        In Buddhism, I often see fire and smoke used to describe how inference works, but not how mind emerges from brain. I would be curious to read your source – if you can remember.


        1. Dale,

          ”by the way if you have sources from a Buddhist perspective so people an check out”

          Some people might find this interesting.

          A Buddhist Critique of Cartesian Dualism in the Cognitive Science
          Naturalizing Mind and Qualia
          William S. Waldron

          And since you mentioned free will several times.

          Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose: Freedom, Agency and Ethics for Mādhyamikas
          Jay L Garfield

          (alternative link)

          ”Anyways, what did you make of my actual arguments for property dualism, anything in there tickle your fancy at all or not?”

          There were views which I had never heard of before, such as Behaviourism, so that was interesting. When I have time I will look up some of the links you’ve posted.

          My general disagreement is with essentialism, whether it is dualism or monism.


  3. Alright Dale, here is my response to the sensations argument.

    I have to admit, this was one of those arguments that Moreland made that I thought no one would ever take seriously. So I was surprised when you named it your top choice. It isn’t like you are stupid or anything, so I was perplexed as to why you would think this was a good addition to the duelist arguments, much less the top one. It occurred to me while I was writing up the response. I don’t think you actually understand the physicallist argument. You can say the words. But I don’t think you ever put yourself in the physicalist mindset and thought through all the requirements and conclusions.

    Anyway, I added in some extra to help you understand what the physicallist argument is presenting. Hope it helps clear some things up for you.

    Also, if you see any spots where I can steal man the dualist arguments in the document, let me know. Also let me know if I misunderstood something, if I’m not being clear or if something needs to be clarified.

    Liked by 1 person

    1. “That said, I don’t think you are appreciating the Differences argument (of which you only address the first listed difference- the presence of qualia).”

      If I am missing something feel free to expand on what you feel I am missing, or not fully appreciating.

      “That said, I don’t think you grasp the significance of the differences between mental properties/states/relations and the corresponding physical ones. The arguments present reason to believe that the mental properties are probably and entirely different order than any physical properties/states in the brain.”

      As I pointed out, the physicalist model also includes the experiences you gave as examples. So what do you feel is the physical/states in the brain that preclude your examples? What reason do we really have to believe that the mental properties are different than the brain states? You gave experiences as examples, but the experiences would be exactly the same under a physicalist model.

      “Think of this way, assuming we are our brains, my brain has various physical properties and states and relations, yet it is not the case that I have “private access” to any of these things;”

      You have said this before, but you haven’t demonstrated it to be true. Under the physicalist model your “private access” would be how your brain is expressing those brain states.

      How does this “private access” suggest an immaterial mental state rather than a material brain state?

      “….there is a clear difference in the two types of properties and states despite as I clearly don’t have private access or incorrigibility of them…”

      Can you demonstrate this is true? How does the brain state clearly mean that you as your brain wouldn’t have private access or incorrigibility?

      “… vs. my mental states themselves so the fact you say it is all the same brain producing these entities, yet there is a difference on this front proves my point-…”

      I guess that is my point. You have yet to demonstrate a meaningful difference as I pointed out in my response.

      How exactly, and in great detail, do you figure that a brain state can’t produce “private access” or incorrigibility since you are your brain?

      “I suggest it is because they are different types of entities altogether, that seems more reasonable/probable to be the case here.”

      I don’t see how that is the case since we know the brain exists, and yet you have no clue what an immaterial mind is, or how it would work. How can something you have zero evidence is even a real possibility, much less exist be more probable than something we know exists?

      “What about the second difference of intentionality-….”

      That is in a different document. Because I changed up the format I need to expand on it, but it is coming.

      “….the two aspects I find most persuasive about this difference are the fact that mental acts/relations, etc. are entirely unrestricted with regard to the kind of objects they an hold- literally anything can have a mental act directed upon it, this is not so with physical relations as they only seem to obtain to a narrow restricted set of things such as the example I gave…”

      I think you are misunderstanding what physical relations are capable of here. You are correct that physical relations can and do act as you describe, but physical relations can do more than just that. For example: A computer is only physical relations, and yet it can still create an entire world of unicorns, Zues’s and spaghetti monsters. The difference is that the brain works on an abstract model that allows it to take ideas and put them together to form new ideas.

      And yet you don’t think that the computer has anything immaterial about it.

      “….but mental intentionality/relations can be about non-existent things such as about Zeus or unicorns or the flying Spaghetti monster- again why the difference, b/c they are not mental intentions/acts are not identical to physical acts/relations- that is the most reasonable explanation.”

      Or, you just don’t understand the full extent of physical relationships. And given the computer can do exactly what you are claiming the physical can’t, I would say you not understanding is more probable than an immaterial mind.

      “Finally, I’m curious as to what form/version of physicalism you would subscribe to Darren, I would put you down as some sort of combination between a Token Identity Theorist and a Functionalist (Non-Reductive form)- is that true?”

      Possibly. Like I said, I don’t care enough to look too deeply into it.

      “Which version/s do you think best describe you and how do you respond to the critiques I gave of that view in the Podcast and sources.”

      Honestly I don’t care about the philosophical distinctions. Philosophy very rarely takes reality into consideration when it is making up its ideas, so I’m not going to try to defend them.

      If it makes you feel better, just assume I am a Darrenist, and if you have any questions about what that means, you can just ask.

      “Also, you promised to give me your own positive argument as how you can prove there is no soul,…”

      It isn’t complete yet, but you can see my work in progress if you like.

      You can feel free to comment on it as will if you like. Just start a new thread. I want this one to be about your argument.


      1. “As to the properties and states of our brain being different than mental states and properties, look I get that your guys simply claim without any evidence that physicalism can explain mental phenomena….”

        And you claim without any evidence that it can’t. Don’t pretend that you are in any better of a position.

        “….but that’s the point of my Differences Argument, there are some things it can’t explain despite them claiming they can (they are wrong)-…”

        Can you demonstrate this is true? What evidence do you have that the physical is incapable of producing experiences/sensations?

        “I cite obvious differences between them that is undeniable to prove it.”

        As I already pointed out. What you are claiming is undeniable doesn’t actually demonstrate the differences you are hoping for. And some of the things you are claiming is impossible for phisical interactions to achieve, computers do all the time.

        “Let’s do this, do you admit that your brain has at least some properties/states that a person does not have private access to and/or incorrigibility about?”

        Only the first person experience or our sensations. But as I already pointed out, that is to be expected under the physicalist model. We don’t expect the people experiencing the sensations directly to have the same experience as those looking from the outdside in.

        It is possible to look at the same thing and have different experiences when looking at it.

        The rest of the items you claim are private access, aren’t, since we can reconstruct them using the brain states as a template.


        1. “Now, I do make a claim based on the evidence that we know with certainty that there are physical properties and states/relations that take place in the brain of which I have no clue…” “This is a real and undeniable difference as you yourself seem to acknowledge and even if you want to argue these are differences only at the phenomenological level than that is enough to show they are not identical.”

          The difference is not in the object being described. The difference is in how you are experiencing that object. That is the mistake you keep mistaking.

          When your receptors are not picking up the dopamine properly your brain interprets that experience. That experience is your brains interpretation of that physical state of your brain; the experience of sadness. You are experiencing that lack of dopamine in one way. When I look at the neurons and see that the dopamine is not getting through, I experience the state of your brain in a different way.

          However both experiences are describing the same thing. A lack of dopamine.

          “1. Please don’t assume I’m making a point or anything- can you just admit that there are physical properties and states of/about our brains that humans do not have private access to and/or know incorrigibly?”

          There are processes in the brain that keep our heart beating and the rest of our body functioning that we are not directly aware of sure.

          “If so, why do these physical properties/states exhibit different features than their associated mental properties and states if they are in fact likewise merely physical properties/states just like any other?”

          They don’t exhibit different features. The mental features are in fact part of the material features. The only difference is if you are experiencing the physical features from the inside or the outside.

          That is why when we shut off your pain neurons, the mental features you associate with pain all change.

          “a) How do you respond to the problem of “inverted qualia”- whereby a colour blind person and a normal sighted person could both perform the same functions in terms of sorting all the red vs. green objects in a room via similar inputs,”

          Can you demonstrate that this is accurate? My father is color blind and he wouldn’t be able to perform that task unless they were slightly off color, in which case they would be different shades of grey to him.

          “b) What do you make of the problem of “absent qualia” in the computer notion, I can program a computer to say Ouch is pricked with a pin but that doesn’t mean it actually feels the quale of having a pain sensation.”

          I would say that this is the benefit to using the computer analogy. We can both agree that there is no qualia involved, so when you say something is impossible without qualia, the soul or immaterial mind, something a computer does all the time, it is the perfect demonstration that you are incorrect in your claim.

          “What do you think of John Searle’s Chinese Room example to illustrate the problem of absent qualia?”

          I think the example completely misses what is actually going on and what is actually being proposed. It also completely misunderstands what we are able to do with computers and how we are making them do the things that they can do.

          “The Chinese Room itself is the equivalent of what’s going on with a computer with its hardware, software and inputs/outputs or functions..”

          Not really. Not when you are talking about modern day neural nets.

          “….and this proves the mental phenomena are not the same as a computer-”

          Not really, as stated above.

          “…- the problem is according to you and Functionalism they currently possess all the requirements to qualify as being able to experience qualia like pain, yet they don’t- they only imitate being in “pain”, they don’t actually “feel” pain.”

          Not yet. But the foundations are there. What you can’t do is make any convincing argument that they never will. You haven’t identified anything that prevents computers from someday experiencing qualia. About the best you can do at the moment is say they currently don’t experience it. At least not in any manner we would recognize as qualia.

          “c) Finally, what about the issue of “unifying” all the various token mental properties and states as belonging to particular type of mental class- such as unifying a pain token of a dog with a pain token of a human- what is it that unifies them under physicalism???”

          The neurons that produce the experience and sensation of pain. Like the ones we found in the mouse. The ones that when turned off changed the mouse’s “qualia”, there direct experience of pain, what it is like to be in pain.

          “The answer is nothing under physicalism/Functionalism;….”

          You have yet to demonstrate that is true,

          “…the Chinese Room proves that qualia can be absent despite all the inputs, internal software and outputs/functions being the same between humans, dogs and/or computers or even aliens for that matter.”

          Sure, it can be. Now you just have to demonstrate that it IS absent.

          “For the dualists we have no issue here, because what unifies all these “pain” tokens in differing brain states is that there is an unifying essential internal “hurtful feeling” and that is what unifies all the tokens into one basic pain type of mental state.”

          Right, but what you haven’t been able to do is demonstrate that your intuition about your mental state is not describing how the brain is processing the brain state.

          That is what you are missing and what the argument fails to do. You can name all the mental states you want. The point is to determine if that mental state is being produced by the brain or an immaterial something else.

          So far you have failed to demonstrate that it isn’t the brain state that you are calling a mental state.


          1. “1. OK good thanks for acknowledging that there are physical states or properties of which you don’t know; I’m satisfied to leave it there as my arguments can take over from there (people can decide if they are successful or not from there).”

            Sure, because we are not directly aware of the physical processes that keep our heart beating, that obviously means that an immaterial something else exists and creates our experience of things.

            Yeah, this is why I classified these arguments under the “to stupid for anyone to take seriously” category.

            “2. a) OK but work with me here Darren, forget the colour blind thing then (you miss the point entirely by saying colour blindness doesn’t work in reality the way I use it- totally irrelevant to the argument)….”

            Then perhaps you need to be more clear. Heaven forbid that your example actually be a good example and represent reality properly and not just be something that was completely made up.

            Because, you know, just making things up is obviously the best way to figure out how reality works.

            “….let’s say they have inverted sight instead (this is a real empirically proven phenomenon called “pseudonormal vision”)- …”

            Can you demonstrate this is true? When I went to look it up all I got were phylosophy pages, and this one ( claims that it is a thought experiment by Locke. Not a real thing.

            “….so when we see redness, he sees greenness and so his sight is “inverted” to you. Under such circumstances one will be experiencing a different qualia yet still qualify as having the same mental state under a Functionalist understanding, thus this theory can’t be true.”

            Then you don’t actually understand what a brain state is. Don’t you feel that you should actually understand your opponents argument before you try to attack it? Seems to me you would be making a lot let mistakes like this one if you did.

            In that scenario the nerve ending coming from the red detecting part of eye would be switched with the green detecting part of the eye. in the part of the brain that processes color. So you are just factually wrong that the brain state would be the same. The brain state includes how the input organs are connected to it.

            So No, This does not in any way disprove anything. All it does is demonstrate that you don’t actually understand the physicalist argument. Which is what I pointed out at the beginning of the thread, and which you are demonstrating to be true here.

            Are you going to admit that this argument doesn’t do what you are claiming? Or are you going to completely ignore my explanation and continue making this completely misguided argument?

            “See the 3 min 30 sec mark to 11 min 30 sec mark here = .”

            Kane B doesn’t seem to understand the physicalist position either. You may want to pick your sources with more care.

            ” I’m saying Functionalism’s notion about a computer being the same as humans in terms of describing how our mental consciousness operates is proven false here-….”

            And I said that was not relevant because I don’t care what Functionalism says. I’ve been pretty clear that I don’t care about Functionalism or what it says. So why in the world are you arguing against functionalism? Why aren’t you actually addressing my arguments?

            Why are you so intent on disproving functionalism that you are completely ignoring what I am saying to you?

            “….all a computer can do right now is imitate us but not actually experience the quale of pain like us.”

            And I pointed out how that is a benefit when refuting soul claims.

            “Thus, if you claim that our mental properties and states can be explained fully via physical inputs, the brain hardware and other internal brain states/properties (software) and then functional outputs (corresponding behaviours)- this has been proven false because computers today can do all of this yet we know they don’t experience qualia- hence Functionalist physicalism fails to explain our qualia.”

            This is another example of how you don’t understand the physicalist argument and how you are trying to refute things that aren’t even being proposed. And badly at that.

            How is a computers lack of qualia evidence that the human brain is not just a brain? How exactly does a computer, that was never designed nor programmed to have qualia, prove that our brains are more than just the brain? How in the world do you link those two ideas together?

            At what point did you demonstrate that just because computers don’t have qualia that it was impossible for physical system to produce qualia?

            “Now as to the Chinese Room example not explaining modern day neural nets- who cares, you’ve already admitted that even modern day computers, as advanced as they are in terms of internal networking etc. (software) still do not experience the sensation of being in pain like us-…”

            So? At what point did you prove that they would never have qualia? Why does it even matter when we are talking about the qualia of a brain and not the qualia of a computer?

            “…the problem of absent qualia illustrated by the Chinese Room, remains conclusive in refuting you skeptics.”

            No it doesn’t. I have no clue how you even get there. The idea that it proves anything is just flat out garbage, and you are just desperately reaching at this point. Since you used that language in the podcast, I am sure you will be ok with it here where it is warranted.

            “See the systems response rebuttal at 17 min 30 sec mark to 20 min mark = . Also, consult a short video by Searle himself on this here = .”

            Yep, not any more convincing when they say it either. At some point you are going to have to realize that just because someone else is saying the same thing you are, doesn’t mean they are right, and it doesn’t make the argument any less ridiculous.

            The idea that the chinese rooms refutes or proves anything is perhaps the most ridiculous claim I have ever heard. And worse, it is just another demonstration that you don’t actually understand the physicalist argument. And even worse than that, it is another demonstration that you haven’t even bothered to try to understand the argument I am making.

            “c) Your not getting this; what is it that unifies a pain-inducing brain state in a mouse to a pain-inducing brain state in a human- physically there is nothing that really differentiates or unifies these things-…”

            Except for the neuron and how the brain is configured.

            You don’t actually understand what I am saying when I say the neuron is what unifies all animal brains do you? But instead of trying to get clarification about it, you instead swing at windmills, arguing against something you have zero understanding of.

            “..maybe a pain sensation to a mouse should be similar to a human smelling a flower sensation (regardless of whether that be pleasurable or unpleasurable- that is beside the point).”

            It is, so why are you bringing it up? I didn’t. The articles i produce didn’t. Do you actually understand what it means that we are able to change Qualia by turning off neurons in the brain?

            “What unifies them under one pain-type of sensation in both despite the radical physiological differences in the brain states that produce the same mental phenomena in both organisms?”

            Wow, you seriously need to learn some basic biology. Neurons are the same across all animals. There are some minor differences, but there are really no radical differences.

            “As a reasonable property dualist I can answer this easily by pointing to unifying internal essential “hurtful feeling” when both are humans and mice are uninhibited in their access consciousness to the pain sensation?”

            So you can say the words “hurtful feeling” and that is just supposed magically mean something? Congratulations you can say the words. Now how does saying the words mean that the brain is not producing those “hurtful feelings”?

            I have absolutely no clue why you think anything you put in the post would be convincing.

            We can change qualia by changing brain states. We can reconstruct images that you are thinking of by using your brain states as a template.

            Nothing in this post or your argument does anything to suggest that it isn’t the brain state that is creating qualia. Showing that a computer doesn’t have qualia doesn’t get you any closer to showing that the brain doesn’t have qualia.

            In fact all you have really done here is demonstrate that you really don’t understand what you are arguing against.

            If you are serious about moving forward, you will need to do two things.

            One, You will need to stop thinking you already know what the physicalist argument is, because you have demonstrated fairly clearly that you don’t.

            And two, you need to stop arguing against these philosophical arguments you think I am producing, because I’m not producing them, I don’t care about them, and when you are arguing against them, you are not actually reading and understanding what I am saying.


            1. Sure, we can look at the scorecard and then move on.

              New information gained by positing an immaterial mind? Zero

              New information gained by recognizing that the brain is the mind?
              – Able to recreate thoughts by looking at the brain.
              – Able to change qualia in a living mind.
              – Medicines that save lives and improve peoples mental states.
              – Giving people the ability to regain lost limbs
              – Giving people the ability to control computers with their mind.
              – Promising medicines that will help stave off dementia and other late life diseases.
              – Promising paths towards creating artificial intelligence.
              – etc, etc.

              So sure, the physcalist argument has been refuted….. so much so that science is successfully learning new things about reality using that model.

              Never trust a theist/apologist when they say that something has been refuted. Like most other things in life, they are just wrong.

              Good luck with your delusion.


  4. Dale,

    Can I please ask that you adjust your presentation style. I found this episode difficult to listen to. I get that you put a lot of work into preparing and are probably reading from a script. That’s fine, but please insert a few inflections and a bit of emotion into your voice, it sound very monotone and ‘lectureish’, which I am sure you’re not intending. Also, can we have a few less over confident assertions that you have destroyed the skeptic argument, phrases that suggest you’re right and the other side is wrong and that’s that, really are off putting, especially when there is so many of them. I very nearly gave up listening to this because of that.

    That said, you presented a good variety of arguments, but arguments only get you so far, if the arguments aren’t supported by evidence, how can we tell if they are valid. More to the point, when arguments are contradicted by evidence, they should be dumped.

    In your episode you cited several evidential pieces that all support physicalism. The blind person who can see gains more information from the sight, a pin prick on the skin creates a physical reaction that results in pain, and finally, the chinese room shows that simple rule following is indistinguishable from actual intelligence.


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